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NOTES
PLEADING NEGLIGENCE
In negligence actions the complaint must set forth facts showing the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff, his acts constituting the breach thereof,
the resulting injury to the plaintiff, and the latter's damage.' In stating
the ordinary negligence action, the problem is to determine how specifically
the occurrence in question should be set forth in the complaint.
Pleading has undergone three metamorphic stages which may be
characterized as issue pleading at common law, fact pleading under the
codes, and finally, under the new rules, a mere statement of a claim
entitling the plaintiff to relief. The least successful of these has been the
code system. 2 The codes almost universally require that the pleader must
state merely dry, naked, actual facts 3 relating the sequence of events which
constitute the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language. Thus
the pleader must plead only ultimate facts, excluding on one hand evidential facts and on the other legal conclusions. If the pleader succeeds
1.
2.

3.

Clak, Code Pleading, 297 (2d ed. 1947).
Id. at 56.
Pomeroy, Code Remedies, 640 (5th ed. 1929).
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in stating only utimate facts, his complaint meets another obstacle. It must
state a "cause of action," a term which remains judicially undefined. 4 The
statement of a claim for relief at common law was surprisingly more
simple and more successful.5
Logically, pleading reforms have been
directed toward the common law form of pleading negligence, but of
course, stripping it of its verbiage and reiteration. To illustrate this
trend a comparison can be made of Form 96 and a typical allegation of
negligence at common law. 7

They are strikingly similar.

Brevity and simplicity is one of the principal objectives of the rules.8
The complaint shall contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 9 It is obvious that the rules
do not require that the pleader state only "ultimate facts" which constitute
a "cause of action."
To illustrate the simplicity it seems apt to consider the manner in
which the claim based upon a defendant's negligence should be stated.
First it is necessary to set forth with reasonable clarity and definiteness
the sequence of events which is relied upon as showing the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff. The pleader should not narrate with particularity
every detail of the occurrence which led to the injury. It is sufficient to
state facts from which the court can easily see a duty owing from the
defendant to the plaintiff. 10 A good illustrative example is Form 9 in the
appendix of forms. These forms are sufficient to withstand attack under
the rules, and the practitioner may rely on them to that extent." The
complaint set forth by Form 9 merely states that on a certain date the
defendant was driving a motor vehicle on a public highway and that the
plaintiff was then crossing said highway. From this short statement the
court can easily see the duty relationship between the parties. That is,
the defendant must drive with reasonable care so as not to strike the
plaintiff.
In some circumstances it may be necessary to be more specific if a
duty is not clearly owing to the plaintiff. For instance, if the plaintiff were
injured while on the defendant's property, the complaint should show how
he was lawfully there. The court could then infer that the duty owing
4.
5.

Id. at 628; 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 255 (Rules ed.

1950).

Holtzoff, Twelve Months Under the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 A.B.A.J.
45 (1940).
6. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Form 9: "Defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway. As a result plaintiff
. . . was injured."
7. Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112 (C. P. 1833): "Defendant so carelessly drove his
horse that through his carelessness his horse struck the plaintiff's horse and cart.
injuring the plaintiff."
8. Supra note 5.
9. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 (a) (2).
10. Clark, Code Pleading, 298 (2d ed. 1947).
11. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 84; Sierocinski v. E. I. DuPont De NeMours
& Co., 103 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1939); Hardin v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 26
F.Supp. 97 (S.D.Dhio 1939); See also, Notes of the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. (1946 Supp.) following § 723c.
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the plaintiff was ordinary and reasonable care. 12 Likewise, in a negligence
action brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act the allegations
of duty must be more specific. Form 14 sets forth the facts sufficient to
show the duty relationship as contemplated by the act. The complaint
must show that the defendant was a railroad company engaged in interstate
commerce, that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant in such
commerce, and that while so employed the plaintiff was injured as a result
of the defendant's negligence. 13
It is also sufficient to allege generally the defendant's breach of duty
or negligent act which produced the plaintiff's injury.' 4 In an action for
damages based upon the breaking of the flywheel of a truck manufactured
by the defendant, the complaint was held sufficient even though it did not
state specifically the manner in which the flywheel was defectively manufactured. 15 In Sierocinski v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.' 6 the court
upheld a general allegation that the defendant negligently manufactured a
dynamite cap in such a manner that it was unable to withstand the
crimping to which the defendant knew it would be subjected. This
simiplicity is well illustrated by Form 9. The breach is set forth by merely
stating that the "defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the
plaintiff who was then crossing the said highway."
To exemplify, a comparsion may be made of these general allegations
and a typical allegation recently made in a negligence action under the
Wyoming Code. 17 In that case the defendant was charged with negligence
in the operation of its truck whereby the plaintiff was struck and injured
while on the sidewalk. The complaint charged the defendant with several
specific acts or omissions as follows:
(1) failing to keep the truck under control; (2) operating the
truck when its brakes were not in good working order;. (3) failing
to keep a proper lookout; (4) driving the truck into the pedestrian
sidewalk and colliding with plaintiff; (5) failing to give warning
that truck was out of control; (6) failing to turn truck to right or
left so as to avoid colliding with plaintiff; (7) failing to inspect
truck and determine if brakes were in good working condition;
(8) failing to maintain and keep the truck's brakes in proper
mechanical condition.' s
It is not clear from the court's opinion whether the plaintiff had originally
pleaded all of these specific acts, or whether they were made upon a motion
for a more definite statement. Even the latter seems of doubtful value
or utility. 19 The person charged with negligence may ordinarily be
12.
13.

Supra note 10; 45 C.J., Negligenge § 643 (1928).
45 U.S.CA. § 51 (1954 ed.); Lewis v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 131 Minn. 122, 154 N.W.
945 (1945).
14 Sierocinski v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 103 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1939).
15. Hartleib v. General Motors Corp., 10 F.R.D. 380 (S.D.Ohio 1950).
16. 103 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1939).
17. McClanahan v. Woodward Construction Co ...... Wyo -.... 316 P.2d 337 (1957).
18. Id. at 339.
19. Clark, Code Pleading, 301 (2d ed. 1947).
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assumed to possess at least equal, if not superior knowledge of the affair
to that possessed by the injured party. 20 In most cases "the piling up of
extensive details in formal allegations is at best delaying2 1 and merely
confusing, at worst unfair and inequitable to the litigants."
22
In Vignovich v. Great Lakes S. S. Co. a paragraph of the complaint
contained numerous allegations of negligence similar to those set out
above. The court held that the pleading violated the federal rule requiring
each averment to be simple, concise and direct. The action was dismissed,
and the plaintiff was allowed twenty days to amend the complaint to a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that he was entitled to

relief.
The complaint must also show a cause and result relation between
2 3
This may
act and the damages sustained by the plaintiff.
negligent
the
result of"
a
"as
or
of"
reason
"by
reciting
merely
by
however,
be shown,
24
two
paragraph
that
Note
injured.
was
plaintif
the
the defendant's act
a
result
"as
that
stating
by
simply
relation
casual
the
forth
of Form 9 sets
plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg broken and was otherwise
injured."
The exact nature of the injury need not be set forth in the complaint.2 5 A mere statement that the "plaintiff had his leg broken and
was otherwise injured" is sufficient.2 6 Where an injury is thus shown the
law will presume general damages to follow. 27 General damages are those
which are the natural and necessary result of the wrongful act. 28 For
example, pain and suffering are the natural and necessary consequences of
a broken leg.
However, where items of special damage are claimed, Rule 9 (g)
requires that they be specifically stated. Special damages are those which
29
These
are the natural but not the necessary result of the wrongful act.
damages arise due to the special circumstances of each case. They must
be specifically pleaded so that the defendant may be informed of the
30
Thus in
nature of the claim against him and not taken by surprise.
Form 9 it is specifically stated that the plaintiff "incurred expenses for
medical attention and hospitalization in the sum of one thousand dollars."
This is a sufficient statement of special damages, made in compliance
with Rule 9 (g) .31 Medical and hospital expenses are naturally expected
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Co., 157 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1945).
Clark, Code Pleading, 302 (2d ed. 1947).
3 F.R.D. 69 (W.D.N.Y. 1942).
Mitchell v. White Consolidated, 177 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1949).
Michels v. Boruta, 122 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1938); see also Clark, Code Pleading 300,
301 (2d ed. 1947).
Trotta v. Cleveland City Transit System, 9 F.R.D. 315 (E.D.Ohio 1949).
Green v. McGaughy, 1 F.R.D. 604 (E.D.Tenn. 1940) ; Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure,
Form 9.
Clark, Code Pleading, 329 (2d ed. 1947).
Elgin v. United States, 89 F.Supp. 195 (W.D.Mo. 1950).
Ibid.
1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 308 (Rules ed. 1950).
2 Moore, Federal Practice, 1924 (2d ed. 1957).
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to flow from such injury but not necessarily in all cases. As a further
example, if a condition or disease which follows an injury is not a necessary
result of that injury the damages growing out of such disease or condition
are special. So where the plaintiff received injuries due to the defendant's
negligent operation of an elevator and a cancerous growtti resulted from
32
such injury, the damages are special and must be pleaded specifically.
One last point in pleading negligence under the rules in Wyoming
deserves consideration. It is a majority rule that a violation of a'municipal
ordinance relied upon as evidence of negligence is not required 'to be
pleaded where the cause of action is common law negligence, rather than
the violation of the ordinance.33 So under an allegation in the complaint
that a train was being run wantonly and recklessly at a high rate of speed,
a municipal ordinance regulating the speed of trains was admissible
though not pleaded.3 4 Some of the Wyoming trial courts have taken the
opposite view and, for instance, will not admit in evidence an ordinance
to prove the speed limit unless the ordinance has been pleaded. The
majority rule is preferable, especially under the new rules, as the following
rationale will show.
It is true that if the law is local or foreign the judge is not expected
to know it and should not take judicial notice of it. If the plaintiff is
relying on an ordinance which creates a penalty in his favor as the foundation of his cause of action, the ordinance should be pleaded.3 5 This will
give the judge and the defendant notice of the complete claim.
But the plaintiff's action may be based on the common law rule that
negligence is the failure to act as a reasonably prudent man. In -such a
case if the defendant has violated an ordinance he has not acted with this
required prudence. Sin(:e the action is based upon the common law and
not on the ordinance, the violation of the ordinance is an evidentiary fact
and may be proved without being pleaded like any other fact tending to
show negligence. 6 This is not an exception to the rule that the court
does not take judicial notice of local or foreign law, but rather, since the
judge does not judicially know the ordinance, it is introduced into evidence like any other fact tending to prove negligence on the defendant's
part. This line of reasoning is in harmony with the theory of the new rules.
In the Sierocinski case 3 7 the court said, "the plaintiff need not plead
evidence. He sets forth a claim when he makes a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
32.
33.

Supra note 28.
Gross v. Pacific Motor Co., 85 Cal.App. 455, 259 Pac. 355

(1927);

Gragg v. Los

Angeles Trust Co., 154 Cal. 663, 98 Pac.. 1063, 16 Ann.Cas. 1061 (1908) ; Christensen
v. Hennepin Transportation Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 147 A.L.R. 945
(1927) ; 1 Bancroft, Code Pleading, Practice & Remedies § 69 (1937); 38 Am.Jur.
Negligence § 330, no. 10 (1941); contra, Blanchard v. Lake Shore & M.S.Ry., 126
I1. 416, 18 N.E. 799, 16 Ann.Cas. 1064 (1888); 38 Am.Jur., Negligence § 330 n. 9
(1941).
34.
35.

Louisville & N.R.R. v. Irwin, 209 Fed. -614 (5th Cir. 1913).
1 Bancroft, Code Pleading § 69 (1926).

36.
37.

Larson v. Lowder, 240 Minn. 80, 282 N.W. 669 (1938).
103 F.2d (3d Cir. 1939).
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"Simplified pleading is basic to any program of civil procedural
reform. With it the modern remedies of discovery, pre-trial, and summary judgment acquire increased significance and effectiveness." 38 This
approach is exemplified by the new rules and the appendix of forms. In
pleading negligence it should be remembered that general allegations are
sufficient in most cases. It the court can reasonably infer that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and that this duty was violated, the
allegation is sufficient. A short statement to the effect that as a result
of such negligence the plaintiff was injured is also sufficient. Of course
if the plaintiff is seeking special damages these should be specifically
stated in the demand for relief. With these simple, direct requirements
the pleader is no longer required to squander time and effort perfecting
long and formal pleadings. Through discovery procedure, a mutual
knowledge of the true issues is gained by the parties, the possibility of
surprise is reduced, and the door to the pre-trial conference is opened
where the issues may be further narrowed. The litigants will be assured
of a greater opportunity for a just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of their rights.
BOB

R.

BULLOCK

PROCEDURE IN LIEU OF SPECIAL APPEARANCES
Under the former practice in Wyoming if the defendant had objections based on the defenses of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over
the person, insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process,
lie had to come into court under a special appearance in order to avoid
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Under this practice
the defendant was in court only for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction., If any action was taken which would recognize the jurisdiction of the court over the merits of the case, the objections based on
jurisdiction were deemed waived and the defendant was held to have
made a general appearance.'
The problems encountered in this situation
are illustrated by the case of Honeycutt v. Nyquist 2 in which the defendant
appeared specially on a motion to quash service. Later, in the court room,
he agreed to a continuance of a hearing on a motion made by the plaintiff.
The court ruled that any action which recognized the case as in court constituted a general appearance, and that by agreeing to the continuance the
defendant had made a general appearance. A more recent Wyoming case
decided before the adoption of the rules defined a correct special appearance by saying that it is made properly when the appearance is for the
sole purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction.8 It is obvious that under
38.
1.
2.
3.

Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1943).
6 C.J.S., Appearances § 9 (1937).
12 Wyo. 183, 74 Pac. 90 (1903).
Vanover v. Vanover- ____
Wyo .

3507 P.2d 117 (1957).

